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I’m a Laycockian! (for the most part)
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, VOLUME ONE: OVERVIEWS & HISTORY. By Douglas
Laycock. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2010. 888 pages. $35.00.

Reviewed by Jay Wexler*
You know you’ve made it, scholarly-wise speaking, when a major
publishing house and a preeminent university approach you to ask whether
they could publish a four-volume set of your collected works.1 Such is the
situation of Douglas Laycock (DL), long-time Professor at the University of
Texas School of Law, now moving from the University of Michigan to the
University of Virginia and most certainly on just about everyone’s short list
of greatest church–state scholars of the past quarter-century. Volume One of
the collection was published in 2010;2 it is subtitled “Overviews & History”
and contains roughly forty pieces written by DL between 1985 and 2009.3
Many of the pieces are academic works; some are newspaper articles or
letters or various other types of nonscholarly writing. The volume, as
observed by the subtitle, includes pieces that communicate DL’s general
views on the Religion Clauses and analyze the historical context of those
crucial provisions. There is also a short section on DL’s views about the
Senate’s role in confirming judicial nominees. Forthcoming volumes will
focus on free exercise rights, statutory protection for religion, and religious
speech/disestablishment, in that order.4
Writing a review of this new volume has presented me with some
difficulties. For one thing, the book is 800 pages long.5 That is pretty long.
More important, however, is that I agree with almost everything in it. In a
field that is marked by sharp debates over just about every single possible

* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. The author would like to thank the
editors of the Texas Law Review for putting together this book symposium and inviting me to
participate. Thanks also to my co-participants, particularly Douglas Laycock.
1. This is even more amazing when the topic of the collected works is only one of your
specialties; Laycock has also written widely on other topics, including judicial remedies, on which
he is a recognized expert and casebook author. E.g., Douglas Laycock, Due Process of Law in
Trilateral Disputes, 78 IOWA L. REV. 1011 (1993); Douglas Laycock, How Remedies Became a
Field: A History, 27 REV. LITIG. 161 (2008); Douglas Laycock, The Broader Case for Affirmative
Action: Desegregation, Academic Excellence, and Future Leadership, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1767 (2004).
2. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, 1 RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: OVERVIEWS & HISTORY (2010).
3. Id. at vii–xi.
4. Id. at xx–xxi.
5. Eight hundred and sixty-four, actually, if you include the appendices and the index. The
book also weighs, according to Amazon, 2.6 pounds. Compare this with David Foster Wallace’s
mega-novel Infinite Jest, also listed by Amazon as weighing 2.6 pounds.
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issue one can imagine, this agreement is remarkable. Indeed, I cannot think
of another major scholar (DL being the major scholar here, obviously, not
me) with whom I agree more wholeheartedly about the vast majority of
difficult issues posed by the First Amendment’s Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses.
Here is a list, likely incomplete, of the things on which DL and I agree:6
the Supreme Court wrongly decided Employment Division v. Smith;7
religious believers should have robust exemption rights from general laws
under the Free Exercise Clause;8 it will generally not violate the
Establishment Clause for legislatures and administrative agencies to grant
exemptions to religious believers from generally applicable laws that
substantially burden their religion;9 given Lukumi10 and a number of lower
court decisions on what counts as a generally applicable law, it is not clear
exactly how much bite Smith will continue to have;11 Smith was wrongly
decided (did I mention that already?; it’s probably worth reiterating)12; the
Establishment Clause prohibits more than just religious coercion;13 likewise,
the Establishment Clause prohibits the support of religion generally as
opposed to simply the support of one sect (in other words, we both reject the

6. I will not bore you by providing citations to places in my own writing where I take any of
these positions. Most, however, can be found somewhere in my book, JAY WEXLER, HOLY
HULLABALOOS: A ROAD TRIP TO THE BATTLEGROUNDS OF THE CHURCH/STATE WARS (2009).
7. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). See Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of
Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 156 (2004), reprinted in 1 RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 2, at 126, 177–78, 185–86
[hereinafter Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty]
(asserting that “the comparative right of Smith . . . still provides protection that is less inclusive,
more complicated, and harder to invoke” than before).
8. See Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion,
39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993 (1990), reprinted in 1 RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 2, at 3, 30 (“If we
take seriously the constitutional right to freely exercise religion, we must restore a judicially
enforceable right to religious exemption in appropriate cases.”).
9. See Douglas Laycock, Regulatory Exemptions of Religious Behavior and the Original
Understanding of the Establishment Clause, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1793 (2006), reprinted in 1
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 2, at 709, 758 (contending that the argument that regulatory
exemptions fall under the Establishment Clause “can suggest results inconsistent with . . .
underlying principles” of disestablishment and free exercise).
10. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
11. See Douglas Laycock, The Supreme Court and Religious Liberty, 40 CATH. LAW. 25
(2000), reprinted in 1 RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 2, at 359, 360–69 (observing that Smith and
Lukumi have left “considerable disagreement” over neutral and generally applicable laws); Laycock,
Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty, supra note 7, at 177–87
(chronicling ambiguities left by Smith’s holding still unresolved after Lukumi and other lower court
decisions).
12. See supra note 7.
13. See Douglas Laycock, “Noncoercive” Support for Religion: Another False Claim About the
Establishment Clause, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 37 (1992), reprinted in 1 RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra
note 2, at 617, 621 [hereinafter Laycock, “Noncoercive” Support for Religion] (pointing out that if
the Establishment Clause only covered religious coercion, it would be redundant with the Free
Exercise Clause).
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theory of “nonpreferentialism”);14 the Court’s “endorsement test” protects
important interests;15 the Court has often misapplied its “endorsement test”;16
“under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance violates the First Amendment;17 so
do Ten Commandments monuments like the one in Austin that the Court
upheld in 2005;18 the rules on funding religion with public money used to be
silly but are much more rational now;19 school voucher programs such as the
Cleveland program upheld by the Court in 2003 are generally
constitutional;20 individuals—including public officials—should feel and be
free to speak in religious terms on policy issues and anything else;21 the
Senate has an important obligation during the judicial confirmation process;22
and Noah Feldman’s recently articulated counterintuitive position that the

14. See Douglas Laycock, “Nonpreferential” Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original
Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 875 (1986), reprinted in 1 RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 2, at
531, 572–73 [hereinafter Laycock, “Nonpreferential” Aid to Religion] (arguing that all
governmental aid to religion is preferential with respect to atheists or agnostics and therefore there
is no governmental aid that is “nonpreferential”).
15. See Douglas Laycock, The Benefits of the Establishment Clause, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 373
(1992), reprinted in 1 RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 2, at 33, 38–41 (claiming that the abolition
of the endorsement test would be a serious loss to religious liberty).
16. See Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, supra
note 8, at 19 (stating that the endorsement test has been “often disaggregated” into two separate
tests); Douglas Laycock, Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause: General Theories, in
RELIGION AND AMERICAN LAW: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA (Paul Finkelman ed., 2000), reprinted in 1
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 2, at 103, 113 [hereinafter Laycock, Free Exercise Clause and
Establishment Clause] (claiming that the endorsement test lacks clarity and is “impossible . . . to
predict”).
17. See Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty, supra
note 7, at 200–05 (arguing that it is difficult to fit the Pledge of Allegiance within any of the defined
exceptions to the Establishment Clause).
18. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005); see also id. at 215 (maintaining that “[l]arge
textual displays of the Ten Commandments should be an easy case” of endorsement under the First
Amendment).
19. See id. at 134–39 (stating that until 1986 religious funding cases involved “much-ridiculed
distinctions,” which have since become somewhat reconciled).
20. See Douglas Laycock, Substantive Neutrality Revisited, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 51 (2007),
reprinted in 1 RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 2, at 225, 262 (reasoning that “subsidizing secular
subjects in a school is fundamentally different from subsidizing religious functions in a church”).
21. See Douglas Laycock, Continuity and Change in the Threat to Religious Liberty: The
Reformation Era and the Late Twentieth Century, 8 MINN. L. REV. 1047 (1996), reprinted in 1
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 2, at 651, 683–85 [hereinafter Laycock, Continuity and Change in
the Threat to Religious Liberty] (contending that “religious arguments in politics are protected by
the text of the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses, and by the constitutional structure of
democracy”); Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 313
(1996), reprinted in 1 RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 2, at 54, 93 (“[P]rivate religious speakers
should be as fully protected as though they were discussing politics”).
22. Douglas Laycock with Sanford V. Levinson, Letter to Senators Joseph R. Biden and Strom
Thurmond, in NOMINATION OF ROBERT H. BORK TO BE ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (1987), reprinted in 1 RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 2, at 490,
491 [hereinafter Laycock & Levinson, Letter to Senators Biden and Thurmond] (stating that the
Senate’s role in selecting judges is equally as important as the President’s).
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Court toughen up on funding and ease up on religious symbols is, frankly,
unpersuasive.23

23. See Laycock, Substantive Neutrality Revisited, supra note 20, at 245–58 (contrasting
Feldman’s views on government religious speech and government funding with the author’s).
Feldman’s position is set out in NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD: AMERICA’S CHURCH-STATE
PROBLEM—AND WHAT WE SHOULD DO ABOUT IT (2005). At the risk of going slightly off my
main topic, but see Laycock, “Nonpreferential” Aid to Religion, supra note 14, at 531–32 (DL
explaining that, despite how his symposium contribution was supposed to be a comment on a paper
by Philip Kurland, he would nonetheless engage in “a fairly common academic maneuver” by
“present[ing] [his] own paper that was vaguely related to [Kurland’s]”), I’d just like to take a
moment to comment on Feldman’s position myself. Feldman argues that courts should abandon the
endorsement test as part of a compromise experiment intended to advance civil peace on matters of
religion and government in the United States. FELDMAN, supra, at 235–49. According to Feldman,
we should “offer greater latitude for public religious discourse and religious symbolism, and at the
same time insist on a stricter ban on state funding of religious institutions and activities” because
doing so would “both recognize religious values and respect the institutional separation of religion
and government as an American value in its own right.” Id. at 237. On the subject of symbols,
specifically, Feldman argues that religious minorities need not feel excluded by governmentsponsored symbols and that this feeling of exclusion is “largely an interpretive choice.” Id. at 242.
I should point out that I agree with Feldman on a couple of things. For one, I agree that we need
to move toward some sort of compromise on these church–state issues. And I also agree that we
should tolerate public religious speech and not insist that religious believers pretend like they are
not religious when they start talking about public issues and whatnot. But unlike Feldman I do not
think we (or the courts) should tolerate government-sponsored religious displays and symbols.
Feldman says that these displays just remind religious minorities of their minority status. See id. at
239 (claiming that religious minorities have no right to be shielded from the “brute fact” that their
faith is in the minority). But nonbelievers (like me—I grew up Jewish and am now an atheist) are
reminded of our minority status already, thank you very much, by the fact that we are minorities.
As minorities, we are already surrounded by Christian talk and symbols all the time everywhere we
look. But just because private individuals can talk about God and Jesus as much as they want,
thereby reminding me that I am a minority, it does not follow that the government, which
purportedly represents me and my interests in addition to everybody else’s, should have the right to
put up a display pointing out that it too thinks my views on ultimate reality are wrong.
Feldman’s argument is that the most natural view of a religious symbol on government property
is that it is just an acknowledgement of the religious majority’s power and influence, rather than an
endorsement of the religion. Id. at 238–44. Moreover, even if this is not the most natural view,
Feldman says that potential plaintiffs can still make an “interpretive choice” to view the symbol as
an acknowledgement rather than an endorsement, and therefore courts should require them to make
such a choice. Id. at 242. In my view, the first part of the argument is unpersuasive, and the second
one unfairly shifts the burden of avoiding harm from the perpetrator to the victim. Also, the
“interpretive choice” thing assumes that we live in something more like an advanced philosophy
colloquium than anything resembling the real world.
What is the most natural view of a religious symbol on government property? I think it is a safe
bet that most people, when they see a religious symbol they do not share on government property,
react by thinking that the government is endorsing that symbol. That is how symbols work. Unless
they have lost a bet or gone insane, when a person or an entity of some sort displays a symbol, they
do it because they believe in the symbol’s truth or value. Why would the government, which is
after all just a group of people making decisions about how to run things, be any different? When
the government displays the American flag, a stamp of Martin Luther King Jr., or the Liberty Bell,
we assume that the government is endorsing patriotism, equality, and liberty, not just that a majority
of the country’s citizens happen to believe in these things and got the government to go along with
displaying them. Why would religious symbols be any different?
It is true that the government might choose, as Feldman says, to acquiesce in a group’s request
“for an opportunity to acknowledge their holiday or tradition.” Id. at 239. The most natural way
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In addition, we have both written not particularly flattering reviews of
Jesse Choper’s Securing Religious Liberty24 but extremely flattering letters to
the Senate praising then-nominee-to-the-Tenth-Circuit Michael McConnell25
(DL was McConnell’s Professor at University of Chicago,26 and his letter
was likely about 8,000 times more important to the Senate Judiciary
Committee than mine). Both of us started our careers more classically

that the government would do this would be to set aside a public area where religious groups can
put up their symbols. Majority traditions would then most likely have the greatest representation in
that public area, either with a greater number of displays, larger displays, or more elaborate displays
or whatever. But minority traditions too would have a chance to put up their symbols, even if they
have to be smaller or made of aluminum foil or drawn with crayons. The Supreme Court decided a
case about such a public forum for the placement of religious symbols and decided that a reasonable
person would not view a religious symbol in such an area (assuming it is appropriately marked) as a
government endorsement of religion. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515
U.S. 753, 764–65 (1995) (holding that private religious speech on a public government forum that is
equally open to all participants would not violate the endorsement test). This decision was correct,
but it involved a much different context than when the government itself puts up a majority
religious symbol, and just a majority religious symbol, on its property. Especially because the
government always has the ability to create one of these public areas for religious symbols, the
Court is right to assume that a reasonable person would see a symbol actually erected by the
government as an endorsement of that symbol. Cf. Richard C. Schragger, The Relative Irrelevance
of the Establishment Clause, 89 TEXAS L. REV. 583, 595–96 (stating that the Court does not look to
the actual purpose of the government, but the purpose apparent to a reasonable observer, as part of
the endorsement test).
This brings us to the second part of Feldman’s argument. Now, when Feldman says that
viewing a religious symbol as an endorsement is an “interpretive choice,” in a way I guess he is
right, in the same way that if somebody called me a “stupid Jew” I would choose to interpret that to
mean that the person thinks I’m a “stupid Jew” instead of choosing to interpret his words to mean
that in fact he hates himself and wishes he was Jewish and is just projecting his own self-hatred onto
me, or maybe that he was raised by bigots and is really making a cry for help and that I should give
him my psychiatrist’s card and suggest he make an appointment. With lots of effort and practice, I
could probably train myself to react differently than I ordinarily would react to a lot of things, but
that does not make the natural reaction less natural or valid. The fact that with a bit of intellectual
gymnastics some people might be able to convince themselves that a government-sponsored
religious symbol just represents an acknowledgement of religion rather than an endorsement is not a
reason to place the burden of avoiding offense on the viewers rather than the government. This is
particularly true because, although perhaps a few people might go around the world self-consciously
making all sorts of “interpretive choices,” the rest of us do not act so hyper-rationally. We see what
we see, and we react the way we react, and the courts should respect this rather than asking us to go
around “interpreting” the world in all sorts of counterintuitive ways.
24. JESSE H. CHOPER, SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: PRINCIPLES FOR JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES (1995); Douglas Laycock, Book Note, Reviewing
Jesse H. Choper’s Securing Religious Liberty: Principles for Judicial Interpretation of the Religion
Clauses, 44 POLITICAL STUDIES 1015 (1996), reprinted in 1 RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 2, at
485 [hereinafter Laycock, Reviewing Jesse H. Choper]; Jay D. Wexler, Book Note, Cleaning the
Mess?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 677 (1997).
25. Douglas Laycock, Letter to Senator Patrick Leahy, in 1 RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 2,
at 500.
26. Id.; see also Chris Mooney, Impaired Faculties?, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (Nov. 4,
2002), http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=impaired_faculties (discussing the strong support
McConnell received from liberal law professors).
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separationist than we are now.27 Neither of us believe in God.28 Both of us
do believe that what one believes about God should have no effect on how
one interprets the First Amendment.29 My middle name is Douglas.30
Lest this review turn into an unadulterated lovefest, however, I should
note I am not (yet, anyway), a complete and unadulterated 100% Laycockian.
I have a few reservations about some of DL’s most important points. I would
like to discuss briefly my most important reservation here before moving on
to some reflections about the volume itself and how it functions as a book.31
One of DL’s most important contributions to church–state law discourse
(I would say it is his most important),32 has to do with the concept of
“neutrality.” The Supreme Court has talked about neutrality in connection
with the religion clauses for a long time,33 and it continues to talk about it
today,34 but it has never been particularly consistent or clear about what it
means by the term.35 In 1990, in a classic article called Formal, Substantive,
and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion,36 published in the DePaul
Law Review and reprinted as the very first piece in the volume under review
here,37 DL pointed out that there are two main types of neutrality—“formal”
neutrality, meaning, in the words of Philip Kurland, “that government cannot
27. Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, supra note 21, at 99 (“All my early sympathies were
with the nonbelieving minority.”).
28. I am an atheist; DL is an agnostic. See id. at 101 (“[M]y agnostic view of religion
predisposes me to an agnostic explanation for religious liberty.”).
29. Douglas Laycock, Remarks on Acceptance of National First Freedom Award from the
Council for America’s First Freedom, in 1 RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 2, at 268.
30. See, e.g., my birth certificate (on file with author). I was informed by DL, subsequent to the
preparation of the first draft of this review, that “Douglas” is in fact DL’s middle name also; he has
another first name which he almost never uses.
31. I would also describe myself as less gung ho about the constitutionality of voucher
programs than DL, and, therefore, also more accepting of programs, like the one in Locke v. Davey,
540 U.S. 712 (2004), that exclude religious schools or courses from those programs. My main
concern about these programs is not that they might promote religion as opposed to non-religion (I
think DL is right to say that the programs simply increase choice for those with religious views) but
rather how they tend to assist some religions—those with the resources and inclination to form
schools and courses—but not others. For more on this, in the context of Cleveland’s Buddhist and
Muslim communities, see WEXLER, supra note 6, at 154–76.
32. DL lists it first when he discusses the principles “associated with [his] work.” 1 RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY, supra note 2, at xvii. Interestingly, Witte lists it fourth, although neither DL nor Witte
explicitly purport to be ranking the principles in any meaningful order. John Witte, Jr., Foreword to
1 RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 2, at xiv.
33. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (“[The First] Amendment requires the state
to be neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers.”).
34. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002) (“[W]here a government aid program
is neutral with respect to religion . . . the program is not readily subject to challenge under the
Establishment Clause.”).
35. See Schragger, supra note 23, 597 (discussing the Court’s “uneven jurisprudence” regarding
“nonendorsement and neutrality”).
36. Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, supra
note 8.
37. Id. at 3.
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utilize religion as a standard for action or inaction,”38 and “substantive”
neutrality, meaning, in the words of DL, that “the Religion Clauses require
government to minimize the extent to which it either encourages or
discourages religious belief or disbelief, practice or nonpractice, observance
or nonobservance.”39 DL has spent much of his career defending and
applying his conception of substantive neutrality as the lodestar for Religion
Clause jurisprudence, and his positions on all sorts of specific controversies
(like most of those listed three paragraphs above) generally follow from his
application of substantive neutrality to whatever controversy he is talking
about.40 In DL’s opinion, applying substantive neutrality will tend to
promote religious liberty, which is what he thinks the Religion Clauses are
best understood to promote.41
Although DL’s specification of substantive neutrality as a distinct and
desirable form of neutrality has marked a thousandfold improvement over
how the Court and commentators previously treated the concept of neutrality,
I am still not convinced that it is worth using the word “neutrality” at all
when talking about the Religion Clauses. As DL points out, neutrality by
itself is not “self-defining” and requires further “specification” to give it
meaning.42 So, we need to explain more specifically what we mean when we
use the word. Still, though, it only makes sense to use the word, I would
think, if the specification we provide still bears some resemblance to some
common understanding of the word’s core meaning. In other words, to take
an absurd example, if we defined neutrality to mean something like
“promotion of Taoism over all other religious faiths,” it would hardly make
sense to call that neutrality. We could do it, of course—much like the Clean
Water Act defines “navigable waters” as “waters”43—and then when
someone objected that it does not really sound anything like neutrality to say
that promoting Taoism is neutral, we could respond that promoting Taoism is
in fact neutral, given that we have defined “neutral” as “promoting Taoism,”
but still, it would not make much sense.

38. Id. at 11 (quoting Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 96 (1961)).
39. Id. at 13.
40. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Church and State in the United States: Competing Conceptions
and Historic Changes, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 503 (2006), reprinted in 1 RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY, supra note 2, at 399 (incorporating his theory into a primer on American law of church
and state); Douglas Laycock, Substantive Neutrality Revisited, supra note 20 (clarifying and
defending his views on substantive neutrality); Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of
Separation and Neutrality, 46 EMORY L.J. 43 (1997) (arguing that substantive neutrality allows for
individual rights and the government’s “obligation of neutrality”).
41. See Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, supra
note 8, at 14 (“The autonomy of religious belief and disbelief is maximized when government
encouragement and discouragement is minimized.”).
42. Id. at 6–10.
43. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2006).
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So, does DL’s concept of substantive neutrality seem enough like what
we generally think of as the core meaning of neutrality to justify calling it
neutrality? I’m not sure. To begin with, note that the definition of
substantive neutrality requires “minimizing” the effect on individual
religious choices, rather than eliminating that effect.44 The question will
often be which of two possible actions (accommodating religion, for
example, or not accommodating it) will minimize the effect of government
action on religious choices. Some government action that affects religious
choices, then, will still be substantively neutral. As DL concedes, for
instance, some judicial exemptions from general laws will have some
tendency to attract nonbelievers to the exempted faith, but not enough of a
tendency to outweigh the negative effect on the exempted faith that would
exist if the exempted faith were not exempted.45 So, if we decided that
judicially exempting members of the Native American Church (NAC) from
eating peyote would have an overall effect of minimizing the effect on
private religious choices (because now those who want to participate in the
NAC will do so, instead of refraining for fear of prosecution), that exemption
would be substantively neutral even if some non-members of the NAC may
start to investigate the NAC because they are interested in finding out what
eating peyote is like.46
Second, like everyone else who supports judicial exemptions, DL
supports the idea that exemptions—even to laws that substantially burden
religious practice—must bend in the face of a compelling state interest.47 I
did not get much of a sense of what DL would consider as counting as such a
compelling state interest from reading this volume (I would think more on
this may appear in the next volume), but surely things like stopping murder,
child abuse, and other sorts of physical harm would count as compelling state
interests. But laws that prohibit these things certainly affect some religious
practices—potentially quite enormously. A religion that demands human
sacrifice is going to have an infinitely easier time flourishing in a society that
grants religious exemptions from murder laws than in a society that does not.
And as we saw in the post-Sherbert/pre-Smith era, courts as a practical matter

44. See supra text accompanying note 39.
45. Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, supra
note 8, at 31 (“[T]he most nearly neutral course will not be very neutral.”).
46. Cf. Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, supra note 21, at 95–96 (DL noting that he thinks
peyote would make him “throw up”).
47. See Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, supra
note 8, at 30–31 (arguing that exemptions are subject to “the government’s proof of a compelling
reason to deny it”). But see Douglas Laycock, Reflections on Two Themes: Teaching Religious
Liberty and Evolutionary Changes in Casebooks, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1642 (1988) (reviewing JOHN
T. NOONAN, JR., THE BELEIVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE: CASES, HISTORY, AND OTHER DATA
BEARING ON THE RELATION OF RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT (1987), reprinted in 1 RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY, supra note 2, at 465, 480 (“I have digressed a long way from Noonan’s book on religious
liberty, and have surely committed the sin of complaining that he did not write a different book.”).
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did find strict scrutiny to be satisfied in a good number of cases,48 so the
compelling interest proviso to the minimization rule of substantive neutrality
is likely to be much broader in practice than my aforementioned extreme
human sacrifice example (think polygamy bans, prison regulations,
destruction of a forest believed by a religious group to be sacred, etc.). By
the way, it is probably worth noting that the fact that we seemingly do not
have many flourishing religions in the United States that require physical
violence is not necessarily evidence that such religions are insignificant;49 it
may simply be evidence that they become insignificant in a culture that
prohibits violence and does not grant violent religions exemptions from those
prohibitions.
Finally, I take it that DL would agree that the government can take
positions, through its speech and actions, that happen to be inconsistent with
some believers’ views about the world, even if, in some cases, it must
exempt the religious believer from having to hear these views directly.50 As I
have suggested elsewhere,51 the government takes positions on nearly every
contested matter of fact and morals pretty much all the time, through the
symbols it displays, the lessons it teaches in schools, the policies it chooses,
and everything else it does. The government, just to choose three examples,
subsidizes beef production,52 teaches evolution,53 and celebrates Martin
Luther King Day.54 These actions (and, just to emphasize, thousands
(millions?) more like them every day) have potentially significant effects on
religious belief and practice. Some religions do not allow the consumption
of beef.55 Some religions do not believe in evolution.56 And some religions

48. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, A Survey of Religious Liberty in the United States, 47 OHIO ST.
L.J. 409 (1986), reprinted in 1 RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 2, at 272, 293–303 (discussing the
post-Sherbert free exercise era).
49. JOHN L. ALLEN JR., OPUS DEI: AN OBJECTIVE LOOK BEHIND THE MYTHS AND REALITY
OF THE MOST CONTROVERSIAL FORCE IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 165 (2007) (noting that
“‘mortification’ is part of the daily spiritual program of all Opus Dei members”).
50. Cf. Laycock, The Benefits of the Establishment Clause, supra note 15, at 40 (“[O]n matters
of governmental policy, somebody has to decide.”).
51. See Jay D. Wexler, Intelligent Design and the First Amendment: A Response, 84 WASH. U.
L. REV. 63, 86–88 (2006) (noting that the United States is so religiously diverse that government
can hardly avoid conflicting with religious views).
52. See Steve Lopez, Plenty of Reasons for a Crowded California, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2004,
2004 WLNR 19769820 (discussing federal livestock subsidies paid to California farmers).
53. See Michael Peltier, Florida Will Teach Evolution But Only as Theory, REUTERS (Feb. 19,
2008), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN1929595320080219 (reporting on new state legislation
mandating the teaching of evolution in schools).
54. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Marking King Day, From Oval Office to Soup Kitchen, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 19, 2010, at A19 (reporting the wide observance of Martin Luther King Day
celebrations in the United States).
55. Xanthe Clay, Meat Off the Menu as Windsor Castle Goes Vegan, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(Nov. 2, 2009), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/foodanddrink/6488123/Meat-off-the-menu-as-WindsorCastle-goes-vegan.html (“The Daoists avoid red meat, while Buddhists and Sikhs are generally
vegetarian. Hindus don’t eat beef . . . .”).
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do not believe in racial equality.57 These religions will have greater
difficulty flourishing in the United States, in terms of attracting believers,
retaining believers, receiving positive reinforcement and press from
nonbelievers, etc., than they would if the government had not adopted these
positions and policies. Notice that none of my examples involves anything
close to an “establishment” of nonreligion; I would agree with DL that the
government may not explicitly endorse or support nonbelief (as opposed to
positions that happen to be consistent with nonbelief) any more than it can
endorse or support belief.58
The relationship between the government actions/speech and the
religious choices of individuals will in some cases be fairly direct and in
other cases rather attenuated, but the relationship will exist in all cases to
some degree nonetheless. In the more direct cases, like teaching evolution,
substantive neutrality may mandate that the government exempt nonbelievers
from having to hear the speech itself, but this only helps minimize the
negative effect of widespread evolution teaching on religious faiths that
disavow evolution; it does not eliminate it. The society is still significantly
affected by the fact that government schools generally teach evolution (and
that government funding agencies fund scientific research based on evolution
and fund museums that assume the truth of evolution, and so on and so on),
and surely fewer people will believe in a religion that rejects evolution in a
society where this teaching occurs than in a society where the teaching does
not occur. Likewise with the beef and MLK examples. Surely fewer people
will join a faith that rejects the eating of beef in a society where beef is
cheaper because of subsidization than in a society where beef is more
expensive. Surely fewer people will join a faith that believes in the
superiority of the white race in a society that celebrates Martin Luther King’s
accomplishments than one that does not.

56. Some Christian denominations that support Creationism include the Seventh Day Adventist
Church, Fundamental Beliefs, OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF THE SEVENTH DAY ADVENTIST CHURCH,
http://www.adventist.org/beliefs/fundamental/index.html (“God is Creator of all things, and has
revealed in Scripture the authentic account of His creative activity. In six days the Lord made ‘the
heaven and the earth’ and all living things upon the earth, and rested on the seventh day of that first
week.”) and the Southern Baptist Convention, Resolution on Scientific Creationism, OFFICIAL
WEBSITE OF THE S. BAPTIST CONVENTION (June 1982), http://www.sbc.net/resolutions/
amResolution.asp?ID=967 (“The theory of evolution has never been proven to be a scientific fact
. . . the Southern Baptist Convention . . . express our support for the teaching of Scientific
Creationism in our public schools.”).
57. Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, S. POVERTY L. CENTER,
http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-files/groups/fundamentalist-church-of-jesuschrist-of-latter-day-saints (“Warren Jeffs’ sermons have him proclaiming, ‘The black race is the
people through which the devil has always been able to bring evil unto the earth.’”).
58. Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, supra note 21, at 73.
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So, importing these three points,59 we might reformulate DL’s
conception of substantive neutrality to something like this: government must
minimize (not eliminate) the effects of its actions on private religious
choices, unless it has a compelling interest and unless it is just sort of going
about its business taking positions on contested issues that will have
potentially significant effects on some religious beliefs and practices. Now, I
guess we could call this a “specification” of neutrality, but I think we could
just as well use some other word to describe it, like maybe “rutabaga.”60
Okay, perhaps that is taking it a little too far, but you see what I am saying.
At some point, the specification of neutrality wanders so far from what we
generally think of as neutrality that it no longer makes sense to call it
neutrality. This is especially true because when courts continue to insist on
using a word with some generally understood core meaning even though they
in fact mean something very specific and kind of far from what most people
think of when they say that word, they inevitably cause substantial confusion
among potential litigants, the press, and the general public. If I had a dime,
for example, for every time I have heard an evolution critic argue that public
schools should not teach evolution because it is not neutral toward religion61
(a claim that I think is true but constitutionally irrelevant), I would have
many, many dimes. I think abandoning the word “neutral” may be overall in
our best interest. Why not just define the relevant standard as I have done up
in the first sentence of this paragraph following the colon, or in some other
way that communicates the standard’s many subtleties and complexities? It
would not be as simple a formulation as “substantive neutrality,” but, then
again, why try to pretend that a doctrine is more simple than it actually is?
Now on to a few words about the book as a book. In the Preface to the
volume, DL suggests that the book’s primary virtue is that it makes
previously nonaccessible writing more readily available to scholars,
particularly those scholars whose primary field is not law. “We hope that
this collection will make this [previously not-too-accessible] work available
to religious leaders and religious scholars,” DL writes, “and to scholars
59. And there are other indeterminacies and complexities as well—for example, in the school
funding context. See Laycock, Substantive Neutrality Revisited, supra note 20, at 261 (discussing
the issue of funding religious schools through vouchers and concluding that “[i]t is very difficult for
government to have no effect on people’s religious incentives; government is the 800-pound gorilla
in the society”).
60. DL informed me, after reading a draft of this Review, that he once made a frighteningly
similar fruit/vegetable related point, when he claimed that the “irreparable injury” rule might
usefully be called “orange banana.” DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE
INJURY RULE 241 (1991). These similarities are getting kind of creepy, wouldn’t you agree?
61. R. Robin McDonald, Evolution, Creation Collide in Fed Court: Some Cobb Parents
Challenge Disclaimer in Biology Textbook, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Nov. 5, 2004, 2004
WLNR 23364429; Robert Royal, Lawsuits Over Intelligent Design and Evolution Pose a
Democratic Dilemma, NAT’L CATHOLIC REP., Oct. 21, 2005, 2005 WLNR 26283645; Terrence
Tobin, Tax Dollars in Support of Atheism, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 27, 1994), http://articles.latimes.com/
1994-11-27/local/me-1987_1_john-peloza-evolution-laguna-hills.
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studying these issues from the perspective of political science, sociology, or
other disciplines.”62 John Witte’s Foreword makes much the same point.63 I
think that both DL and Witte are correct about this virtue of the volume, and
I am glad to see that the book is priced in a way that will truly make it
accessible to individuals working in these cognate fields, as well as to
libraries.64
Given the purpose of the book—to collect DL’s writings on religious
liberty in one convenient place—it is probably unlikely that many readers
will in fact read the volume from beginning to end (unless, perhaps, he or she
is writing a dissertation on DL’s work, which is surely something that
someone might do). Having been tasked with reviewing the book, however,
I did read it from beginning to end, and I have to say that I found it well put
together and enjoyable to read in that fashion. The articles engage in a good
amount of repetition, but I found that to be a virtue, in that by the end I felt
like I had a real sense for DL’s positions on a whole host of issues that I
might not have had otherwise, without going back and re-reading previous
pieces (things do not often sink in for me the first time I read them). The mix
between longer pieces and shorter ones, scholarly ones and those written for
different audiences, is well done and shows off DL’s ability (not so often
found in the world of legal academia) to write lucid prose that just about
anyone can read without getting a headache. Indeed, as someone who
flinches at the notion of reading too many law review articles in any given
two-week period, I can honestly say that even the most hardcore of DL’s
scholarly writings—the Harvard Law Review piece on Locke v. Davey and
the Pledge of Allegiance case65—is written with an obvious (and, again,
rather unusual, given the field) interest in communicating with readers.
But this last point leads me to one sort of nagging wish about the book.
As I worked my way through the volume’s eight hundred or so pages, I kept
wondering whether the time and money and other resources spent on putting
this collection together might otherwise have been better spent at producing a
shorter and fully original book setting out DL’s views on religious liberty
and the First Amendment for the general public. Now, of course, this “I
think you should have written a different book” position is the classic unfair
line to take when writing a book review,66 and far be it for me to suggest to
62. 1 RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 2, at xx.
63. Witte, supra note 32, at xiv–xv.
64. Eerdman lists the book at $35. Expensive, yes, but nothing like the absurd amounts
academic books are often sold for. Religious Liberty, Volume 1: Overviews and History,
EERDMAN’S CATALOGUE, http://www.eerdmans.com/shop/product.asp?p_key=9780802864659.
65. Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, The Pledge Of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty,
supra note 7, at 126–224.
66. But see Douglas Laycock, Reflections on Two Themes: Teaching Religious Liberty and
Evolutionary Changes in Casebooks, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1642 (1988) (reviewing JOHN T.
NOONAN, JR., THE BELEIVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE: CASES, HISTORY, AND OTHER DATA
BEARING ON THE RELATION OF RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT (1987), reprinted in 1 RELIGIOUS
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DL or to John Witte or to Eerdmans what they should be doing with their
time and money. Still, though, I think that DL’s ability to write clearly and
effectively, when coupled with his passion for the subject and willingness to
follow his principles wherever they may take him (to say nothing of the
extreme erudition he brings to his work), practically screeches out for a book
that speaks to readers outside the academy. Okay, enough complaining.
Maybe such a book is in DL’s future. Maybe it is not. Either way, we have
got (or at least, we will soon have) this four-volume collection, and that is
more than enough accomplishment for one career.

LIBERTY, supra note 2, at 465, 480 (“I have digressed a long way from Noonan’s book on religious
liberty, and have surely committed the sin of complaining that he did not write a different book.”).

